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Abstract. The present study explores the deployment of attention towards non-
conscious information. It is both theoretically and empirically likely that the 
deployment of attention can be controlled by information which is not con-
sciously registered (attentional priming), similar to the control of sensorimotor 
responses by nonconscious information (response priming). However, not much 
is known about the functional basis of attentional priming. The present experi-
ment explore whether and how strongly intentions (current action pans) deter-
mine whether attention is allocated towards invisible information (so called di-
rect parameter specification). The results demonstrate that intention-mediated 
control is possible, but it seems to break down easily, that is to provide a weak 
and non-robust type of control . 
Keywords: visuo-spatial attention, metacontrast, masking, intention, direct pa-
rameter specification, perceptual latency, priming 
1   Introduction 
The assumption that a precondition of conscious perception of a stimulus is that 
this same stimulus has been attended to is common in theories of visual awareness. It 
allows an interesting prediction: It should be possible to control the deployment of 
visuo-spatial attention by information which itself is not consciously perceived. 
This possibility has been tested in several recent studies and yielded interesting re-
sults. For example, McCormick (1997) studied costs and benefits of a peripheral cue 
on response times. Peripheral cues—abruptly onsetting, mostly visual stimuli—are 
commonly assumed to capture attention towards their location. This leads to benefits 
in discrimination of or responding to a stimulus which appears at this location. On the 
other hand attention produces costs if the relevant stimulus appears at another location 
(e.g., Posner, 1980). McCormick observed that such costs and benefits were inde-
pendent of whether the participants were aware of the peripheral cue. In an ‘unaware’ 
condition, the peripheral cue was of low contrast and the observers could not reliably 
report its presence. Nevertheless, it speeded response times if it correctly predicted 
the location of the target, and increased response times if it appeared at a different 
location. Such costs and benefits are typically ascribed to visuo-spatial attention. 
Jaśkowski, van der Lubbe, Schlotterbeck, and Verleger (2002) used a more power-
ful means of excluding a stimulus from conscious perception, namely metacontrast 
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masking. Metacontrast is a type of visual backward masking in which the mask later-
ally adjoins the masked stimulus (Breitmeyer, 1984). For example, a disk could be 
masked by a ring, or a bar by two flanking bars. With onset intervals of about 40 to 80 
ms, the masked stimulus often is perfectly invisible. In the study of Jaśkowski and 
coworkers, conscious perception of the masked stimulus was at chance level. As de-
pendent variable, the authors measured event-related potentials. Although there was 
no clear evidence for deployment of attention to the masked stimulus, they found that 
the posterior contralateral negativity—a lateralized difference in the event-related 
potentials that indicates selection of a contralateral target—lacked if the masked 
stimulus correctly predicted the location of the target in the mask. By contrast, atten-
tional selection as indicated by the posterior contralateral negativity was necessary if 
the target in the masked and in the masking stimulus were on opposite sides. Thus, the 
masked stimulus left a ‘trace’ on visual selective attention. 
As Jaśkowski and coworkers, Scharlau and Neumann (2003a) used metacontrast 
masking for preventing perceptual awareness of a visual stimulus. They assessed the 
influence of attention with a perceptual measure, perceptual latency priming. This 
method relies on the finding that attending to a stimulus or its location speeds up its 
processing and thus shortens its latency. This “prior entry” of an attended stimulus 
has been studied extensively in the 19th and early 20th century (e.g., Titchener, 1908; 
Wundt, 1887) and has recently again gained interest (e.g., Rorden, Mattingley, Kar-
nath, & Driver, 2002; Shore, Spence, & Klein, 2001; Stelmach & Herdman, 1991). 
In the paradigm used by Scharlau and Neumann (2003), attention is drawn to a lo-
cation by a peripheral visual stimulus, the so-called prime. This prime is after a short 
interval masked via metacontrast by a target appearing at its location. The perceptual 
latency of this target is compared with that of an unprimed target appearing at a dif-
ferent location. The authors found a robust facilitation of the primed target’s latency. 
Yet, the observers were unable to discriminate the features of the prime and could 
barely detect its presence. This phenomenon is called perceptual latency priming.  
Attentional processing of masked or nonconscious information is a new paradigm, 
and much of its functional basis remains to be understood. At present, insights might 
be gained from related fields, such as sensorimotor processing of masked information 
(response priming). Such an attempt seems to be justified by a wealth of findings 
showing that the control of attention might be mandatorily coupled to the control of 
responses, especially saccades (e.g., Bekkering & Neggers, 2002; Deubel & Schnei-
der, 1996), that is, it might rest on a similar functional basis.  
One exciting finding with respect to sensorimotor processing of masked visual in-
formation is that it depends on current intentions of the observer. Ansorge and Neu-
mann (2005) found that appropriate intentions were necessary to produce sensorimo-
tor priming effects. They demonstrated that primes whose colour was different from 
those of the targets—that is, which were not expected or intended by the observers—
did not affect the responses to the targets. Similarly, Klotz and Neumann (1999) ob-
served that the effect of a masked prime shape to responses to visible targets was 
largely reduced and indeed statistically not reliable if the participants continually and 
randomly had to change the stimulus-response-mapping, that is, their intentions. 
Such findings can be explained by the model of direct parameter specification 
(Neumann, 1990). This model combines three important assumptions. First, informa-
tion can be processed in the visuo-motor system without being consciously perceived. 
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This processing route leads directly from sensory input to motor output and bypasses 
conscious control (‘direct specification’). Possible motor parameters which can be 
specified include pointing direction (Schmidt, 2002), button presses (Klotz & Neu-
mann, 1999), or pronouncing words (Ansorge, Klotz & Neumann, 1998). Second, this 
specification is not automatic. The responses studied in this domain are artificial be-
haviours depending on specific instructions to the human observers. 
Third, such “direct specification” of response parameters is possible only under 
specific conditions. Most importantly, the sensory information has to meet a pre-
established action plan which identifies how to respond to this information. For ex-
ample, masked primes may activate left-hand or right-hand responses in a given ex-
perimental setting. Yet, they do so only under the condition that they match the cur-
rent intentions of the observer. For example, if the observer has to respond to a red 
target with a left-hand response and to a green target with a right-hand response, a 
masked red prime will activate and eventually trigger a left-hand movement and a 
green prime will activate or trigger a response with the right hand. A yellow or blue 
prime, however, will trigger neither response, because it is not part of the action plan. 
In sum, direct parameter specification predicts a specific pattern of empirical re-
sults. First, masking must not damage the impact of a stimulus on sensorimotor proc-
essing. Second, only information which matches current criteria specified in the ac-
tion plan elicits priming. The present paper is concerned with the second prediction. 
Will any abrupt-onset prime capture attention, as earlier results (e.g., Scharlau & 
Neumann, 2003) suggest? Or will primes capture attention only if they match the 
action plan or intentions, as the model of direct parameter specification suggests? 
Indeed, in a recent study, Scharlau and Ansorge (2003) reported that attentional al-
location towards nonconscious primes was mediated by the current intentions. In their 
experiments, the observers judged the temporal order of two targets defined by col-
our, for example red and blue, while ignoring further distractor stimuli of, for in-
stance, yellow colour. Blue and red primes elicited latency facilitation, which indi-
cates that they attracted attention. Yellow primes, however, entailed only a small 
latency benefit which was not statistically different from zero. Unfortunately, there 
was a confound in the study of Scharlau and Ansorge: Matching primes had the same 
colour as the primed target (e.g., blue prime and blue target), distractor primes always 
had a different colour (e.g., yellow prime and blue target). Thus, the DPS-like pattern 
in the results might also be explained by a further factor, speeded processing of re-
peated information or perceptual priming. The present study attempts to remove this 
confound and explore direct specification of attention shifts further. 
2   Experiment 1 
The present experiments explore whether attention is controlled by non-conscious 
information depending on and in accordance with current intentions of the observer. 
Attention is assessed via its facilitating influence on the perceived latency of an at-
tended stimulus (as compared to an unattended stimulus). In advance of one target, a 
prime is presented which—if it captures attention to its location—should shorten the 
perceptual latency of the later target trailing at this location (perceptual latency prim-
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ing). The match of the prime to the current intention is varied. It either corresponds to 
the target set (intention-matching prime) or it resembles a distractor set (non-matching 
prime). In order to study whether perceptual similarity influences the amount of prim-
ing, the matching prime is either similar (feature of the target at the same location) or 
dissimilar (feature of the other target). If, for example, the participants have to judge 
red and blue targets and ignore yellow distractors, in the matching/similar condition, a 
red target is preceded by a red prime, and a blue target by a blue prime, in the match-
ing/dissimilar condition, a red target is preceded by a blue prime and a blue target by 
a red prime, and in the non-matching condition, the red target as well as the blue tar-
get is preceded by a yellow (distractor-coloured) prime. 
The most powerful proof of DPS would be a large effect of the intended prime, ir-
respective of similarity, combined with no effect of the non-matching prime. Quanti-
tatively, the size of perceptual latency priming by a matching prime should be ap-
proximately half of the onset interval between prime and primed target (Scharlau & 
Neumann, 2003). The DPS account would be most strongly supported if the non-
matching prime had no influence at all, but it suffices if the non-matching prime elic-
ited reliably less perceptual latency priming than matching primes. 
2.1   Participants, Apparatus, Stimuli, and Procedure 
Fourteen voluntary naïve participants with normal or corrected-to-normal visual acu-
ity (9 female; mean age 28 years) gave their informed consent and received € 4 or 
course credits.  
Participants sat in a dimly lit room. Their head rested on a chin rest, their line of 
gaze was straight ahead, and viewing distance was fixed at 60 cm. Stimuli were pre-
sented on a 17 in. colour monitor with a refresh rate of 60 Hz. The participants re-
sponded by pressing either the left or the right key of a mouse.  
Targets were rings with a diameter of 1.9° of visual angle. Primes were smaller 
rings which fitted into the inner contours of the targets (1.3°). The stimuli were pre-
sented in three colours: yellow, red, and blue. For each participant, one of the colours 
was chosen as the distractor colour and had to be ignored. Distractor and target col-
ours were balanced across participants. The stimuli were presented on 6 positions on 
an imaginary circle presented around fixation (11° diameter). In each trial, 4 stimuli 
were shown, two distractors and two targets of different colour. In three quarters of 
the trials, a masked prime was shown in advance of one of the targets at the same 
location. It was either matching/similar, matching/dissimilar, or non-matching. In the 
remaining quarter of the trials, there was no prime. 
Target intervals (onset asynchronies between the two targets) were –128, –64, +64, 
and +128 ms. Negative numbers indicate that the primed target was presented in ad-
vance of the unprimed targets, and positive that the unprimed target appeared first. 
The prime, if presented, led the primed target by 80 ms. Two distractors were pre-
sented, one leading the primed target by 16 or 48 ms, the other one simultaneously 
with the primed target. This temporal proximity should ensure that the observers 
really had to disregard the distractor in order to find the target. For two example trials, 
see Figure 1. 
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Fig. 1. Examples of two trials. Each trial begins in with a fixation cross (bottom screen). 
Primes, targets and distractors appear in various sequences. The prime might be the first stimu-
lus (left trial) or the second one (right trial), and the primed target might lead the unprimed 
target (left trial) or vice versa. One of the distractors is presented simultaneously with the 
primed target, the other one shortly before it. Exemplary time values are given in the lower 
right corner of the screens.—Stimulus colours are given by grey shades and line types. Stimuli 
are not drawn to scale. 
Targets and distractors were visible until the participants pressed the response but-
ton; the prime was deleted after 32 ms. There were 16 experimental conditions (4 
target intervals × 4 priming conditions, unprimed, matching/similar, matching/dissi-
milar, non-matching). Each condition was presented 24 times in a random order re-
sulting in a total of 384 trials.  
The participants fixated on a central cross throughout each trial. They judged the 
temporal order of the targets, indicating with the mouse buttons which of the two 
targets had appeared first. The instruction emphasized accuracy; there was no time 
pressure. Every 64 trials, a break was inserted automatically. 
2.2   Results and Discussion 
From the judgment data, psychometric functions were constructed for each experi-
mental condition (Figure 2, left part). The individual psychometric functions were 
approximated by logistic functions. Logit analysis (Finney, 1971) was used to esti-
mate the Point of Subjective Simultaneity (PSS) for each participant. The PSS is the 
point on the fitted logistic function at which the observer cannot discriminate the 
temporal order (subjective simultaneity; p = 0.5). In unprimed trials, PSS is usually 
zero. A positive (rightward) shift of PSS in primed trials indicates perceptual latency 
priming: Simultaneity is perceived when the unprimed stimulus appears in advance of 
the primed one. Perceptual latency priming was assessed by subtracting the PSS in 
unprimed trials from each of the PSS’ in the primed conditions.  
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Fig. 2. Left: Psychometric distributions of Experiment 1. Perceptual latency priming is indica-
ted by a rightwards shift of the distribution. It is evident for all primed conditions. The PSS can 
be inferred from the intersection of distribution and the horizontal line at the .5 probability. The 
right part of the Figure gives the PLP values in relation to the priming interval (80 ms, y-axis). 
Figure 2 (right part) depicts the amount of perceptual latency priming. As can be 
seen, latency priming is present in all of the conditions. Its size does not change with 
intention. Individual latency priming values were submitted to a one-way repeated-
measures analysis of variance and to separate t-tests against zero. The t-tests showed 
that priming was present in all of the conditions (all ts(19) ≥ 3.27, all ps < .01). Per-
ceptual latency priming values were 42, 43, and 43 ms, that is, in the expected range 
of half to two thirds of the priming interval (80 ms). Yet, a main effect of priming 
condition was not found in the analysis of variance (F(2, 26) = .02, p = .98). 
That is, there was no evidence for intention-mediated control of attention shifts in 
Experiment 1. This may be due to at least four reasons. First, Experiment 1 might not 
have enough power to reveal the effect of intention-match. This argument is not very 
convincing, because the latency priming values are highly similar. Second, direct 
specification of attention shifts might be impossible and the earlier positive finding an 
artefact of the sensory confound (Scharlau & Ansorge, 2003). Third, the non-mat-
ching primes do, in fact and unfortunately, match the intentions partly, because they 
have an abrupt onset, and this onset is important for the intention to judge temporal 
order. Thus, it is conceivable that the effect of onset-match is so strong (or so quickly 
arising) that it does not leave enough room for the (smaller) effect of colour-match to 
operate. Fourth, the conditions used in the present experiment might not favour inten-
tion-mediated control. DPS-type control of sensorimotor priming effects seems to rely 
on the number of target stimuli (Kiesel, Kunde, Pohl, & Hoffmann, 2006). The num-
ber of visible target stimuli is very small in the present experiment (two plus one 
distractor). Thus, it should be tested whether direct specification of an attention shift 
emerges with a simpler action plan. Experiment 2 tests the two last conjectures.  
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3   Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 was similar to Experiment 1. Only the matching/similar condition was 
abandoned in order to simplify the action plan. This measure forecloses to test 
whether a similarity confound was responsible for the DPS-like findings of Scharlau 
and Ansorge (2003). However, this was not the central aim of the present study. The 
main question—whether intentions guide attentional processing of nonconscious 
information—remains unaffected by this measure. 
3.1   Participants, Apparatus, Stimuli, and Procedure 
Twenty voluntary naïve participants with normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity 
(11 female; mean age 26 years) gave their informed consent and received € 3 or 
course credits. Apparatus, stimuli, and procedure were the same as in Experiment 1. 
The matching/similar condition was omitted. Trials were thus reduced to 288.  
3.2   Results and Discussion 
Data were treated as above. Perceptual latency priming was found in both conditions, 
as indicated by t-tests (matching/dissimilar: 43 ms, t(19) = 4.32, p < .001; non-
matching: 32 ms, t(19) = 3.27, p < .01). The difference was statistically significant 
(t(19) = 2.25, p < .05). 
In contrast to Experiment 1, the present experiment revealed that intentions medi-
ate the deployment of attention towards non-conscious visual information. The non-
matching prime captured attention less effectively or less often than the matching  
prime. The experiment also confirmed that the non-matching prime is also an effec-
tive attentional signal: Its effect is by 10 ms smaller than the effect of a matching 
prime, but it is still quite large (32 ms). 
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Fig. 3. Left: Psychometric distributions of Experiment 2. Perceptual latency prim-
ing is indicated by a rightwards shift of the distribution. It is evident for all primed 
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conditions. The PSS can be inferred from the intersection of distribution and the hori-
zontal line at the .5 probability. The right part of the Figure gives the PLP values in 
relation to the priming interval (80 ms, y-axis). 
4   General Discussion 
The experimental results reported above support recent evidence on the role of inten-
tions in the processing of nonconscious information. Yet, they do so only partly. In 
sum, intention-matching nonconscious primes can capture attention more effectively 
than primes which match distractor information. However, they do not necessarily do 
so. Supposedly, intention-mediated capture by nonconscious primes might even be an 
exception rather than the rule. On the level of processes: Current intentions might 
mediate whether attention is deployed towards nonconscious information, but they do 
not necessarily and maybe only exceptionally do so. 
The experiments indicate heavy limits of direct specification of attention shifts that 
will be analysed in the following. First, non-matching primes captured attention in 
both experiments, and they did so to a reasonable degree, that is, resulted in latency 
facilitation of 43 ms in the first, and 32 ms in the second experiment. These values are 
similar to those reported by Scharlau and Ansorge (2003), and they are in the lower 
range of facilitation values reported for matching primes (Scharlau & Neumann, 
2003).  
Yet, the interpretation of this finding is not clear. As mentioned above, it is diffi-
cult to relate it to the operation of direct specification (intention-mediated control) of 
attention shifts because of the following reason: In a temporal order judgment task, 
observers are likely “set for” onsets as well as specific features (colour in our case). 
This is so, because they are required to judge temporal order which presupposes that 
onsets are registered. Thus, the perceptual latency priming effect of a distractor-like, 
non-matching prime can be due to automatic attentional capture and thus reflect a 
breakdown of direct specification, but it may also be a direct specification mode in 
which any onset captures attention. Which of these explanations holds requires further 
data, though outside the temporal-order judgment domain. 
As a second cutback, in Experiment 1, there was no direct specification at all. How 
might this be explained? It should not be regarded as an experimental artefact, be-
cause the data were neat and the variance was not unusually high. Further, a replica-
tion with another sample of participants showed exactly the same absence of direct 
specification. One might thus speculate that direct specification by nonconscious 
information is a fragile control mode and might collapse easily and even under 
weakly unfavourable conditions.  
Which were these unfavourable conditions? Experiments 1 and 2 differed in the 
number of conditions (and, consequently, trials). There are some hints that stimulus 
set size affects whether direct specification is present or not (Kiesel, Kunde, Pohl, & 
Hoffmann, 2006), but this finding refers to speeded responses in a semantic classifica-
tion task, and stimulus set was much larger than in the present experiments. Interest-
ingly also, it is not the instructional set which differs between Experiments 1 and 2: 
The observers had exactly the same instruction. The only difference was that among 
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the sequences of an invisible and a visible stimulus in Experiment 1, there was a very 
simple one in which the two stimuli had the same colour, whereas in Experiment 2, 
the stimuli always differed in colour. Why this overloads the direct specification 
mechanism remains obscure. 
Note also that the present experiments imply a marked contrast between direct 
specification of an attention shift and direct specification of motor responses. The 
latter has been reported for a variety of stimuli, including colour stimuli, and is a 
robust finding (Ansorge & Neumann, 2005; Schmidt, 2002). This difference indicates 
that sensorimotor specification is a more powerful mode of processing nonconscious 
information than direct specification of an attention shift.  
As a final open question, the precise mechanism by which the intention-mediated 
deployment of attention is realised remains to be specified. Less capture by non-
matching primes might be due to one or several of the following reasons. Non-
matching primes might capture attention in a smaller proportion of trials than match-
ing ones, capture attention more slowly than matching ones, or capture attention ini-
tially, but result in a disengagement of attention after the error is detected. If the latter 
holds, the question why including the matching/similar condition abolished the inten-
tion-mediated effect might find an easy answer: In the matching/similar condition, no 
colour change between prime and target can be detected, and if the attentional filter 
system can be reset easily and quickly (as, for example, DiLollo, Kawahara, Zuvic, & 
Visser, 2002, suggest), this absence of a detectable error might bias the attentional 
control system towards orienting to any onset, including the non-matching primes. 
To sum up, the present experiments reveal a robust and strong deployment of atten-
tion towards non-consciously registered information. They also demonstrated some 
control of this deployment by the current intentions. Yet, although theoretically inter-
esting, it seems too weak or unreliable for practical applications. 
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